11b. The Ariane 5 Failure

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Readings

- Computer-related RISKs. P. G. Neumann, Addison Wesley 1995. A compendium of information about system failures that have compromised safety, security and reliability
- U. Aßmann, B. Demuth, F. Hartmann. Risiken in der Softwareentwicklung. Zeitschrift der TU Dresden.
- R. Glass. Software Runaways.
- D. Rombach, A.Endres: A Handbook of Software and Systems Engineering. Pearson

Greatest Software Desasters

Greatest Software Desasters

- Tchernobyl 1986
  - Human desaster, but the software could be stopped, and tricked out
  - The reactor nucleus was “poisoned”
  - The operators removed the moderating elements, to get more power
  - The reaction of the reactor came so fast (within 2 minutes) that no human reaction was possible
- Mariner (in the 60s)
  - A comma instead of a dot spoiled the software, Mariner got lost in space
- Hamburg goods railway station ~1995
  - Software control system should be replaced
  - Could not be tested in vivo
  - Switching failed – several days of delays in German railway traffic
- Denver International Airport ~1993
  - Bagage system was delivered several years later
  - Project managment problem: the software for Continental Airlines was extended for the whole airport

Greatest Software Desasters

- TollCollect
  - German toll collection system for lorries, based on tracing
  - Promised end of August 2003 [Daimler, Telekom]
  - Delivered more than a year later
- EBay down for a day in 2002

The Ariane 5 Launcher Failure

June 4th 1996

Total failure of the Ariane 5 launcher on its maiden flight

The following slides are from Ian Summerville, Software Engineering

Ariane 5 Launcher Failure

- Designed to launch commercial payloads (e.g.communications satellites, etc.) into orbit
  - Ariane 5 can carry a heavier payload than Ariane 4
  - Ariane 5 has more thrust (Schub), launches steeper
- 37 seconds after a lift-off, the Ariane 5 launcher lost control
  - Incorrect control signals were sent to the engines
  - These swivelled so that unsustainable stresses were imposed on the rocket
  - It started to break up and self-destructed
- The system failure was a software failure

The Problem

- The attitude and trajectory of the rocket are measured by a computer-based inertial reference system
  - This transmits commands to the engines to maintain attitude and direction
  - The software failed and this system and the backup system shut down
- Diagnostic commands were transmitted to the engines
  - ..which interpreted them as real data and which swivelled to an extreme position
- Integer overflow failure occurred during converting a 64-bit floating point number to a signed 16-bit integer
- There was no exception handler
  - So the system exception management facilities shut down the software
- The backup software was a copy and behaved in exactly the same way.

Software Reuse Error

- The software that failed was reused from the Ariane 4 launch vehicle.
- The computation that resulted in overflow was not used by Ariane 5.
- Decisions were made
  - Not to remove the facility as this could introduce new faults
  - Not to test for overflow exceptions because the processor was heavily loaded.
  - For dependability reasons, it was thought desirable to have some spare processor capacity

Why not in Ariane 4?

- Ariane 4 has a lower initial acceleration and build up of horizontal velocity than Ariane 5
  - The value of the variable on Ariane 4 could never reach a level that caused overflow during the launch period.
  - That had been proved (for Ariane 4)!
- As the facility that failed was not required for Ariane 5,
  - there was no requirement associated with it.
- As there was no associated requirement,
  - there were no tests of that part of the software and hence no possibility of discovering the problem.
- During system testing, simulators of the inertial reference system computers were used.
  - These did not generate the error as there was no requirement!

Review Failure

- The design and code of all software should be reviewed for problems during the development process
- Either
  - The inertial reference system software was not reviewed because it had been used in a previous version
  - The review failed to expose the problem or that the test coverage would not reveal the problem
  - The review failed to appreciate the consequences of system shutdown during a launch

Lessons Learned

- In critical systems
  - Don't run software unless it is actually needed
  - Return best effort values if the absolutely correct values cannot be computed
  - Do not have system shut-down as default exception handler in systems that have no fail-safe state
- Test for what the system should do,
  - and what the system should **not** do
- Wherever possible, use real equipment and not simulations
- Improve the review process to include external participants and review all assumptions made in the code

The End